Health Care
Procedures
by Christopher Dodson,
Executive Director, North Dakota Catholic Conference
May 2004
Does a health care provider in North Dakota have a right to
not perform a procedure that violates his or her religious
or moral beliefs? Does a health care institution have to
perform every type of procedure? The answers to these
questions surprise many health care providers and puzzle
most everyone else.
Enactment of legislation is rarely a simple matter. In many
ways, it is like trying to hit a moving target. This is
particularly true in North Dakota, where we tend to avoid
general, far-reaching laws, and focus on only what is
needed at the time. In the aftermath of Roe v. Wade the
North Dakota legislature, passed legislation protecting the
right of persons not to participate in abortions. At the
time, many did not perceive that there would be other
procedures in the future to which health care providers
might have deep moral objections.
Legislation also consists of compromises. A bill will often
include provisions that were not central to the
bill’s purpose, but were included in the process.
This happened when the legislature passed state’s
laws on “living wills” and durable powers of
attorney for health care. Recognizing that the law and
public perception on end-of-life issues were changing, the
legislature included in both laws the right of a health
care provider to not engage in a procedure that resulted
from a living will or came from an agent with a durable
power of attorney for health care.
The result is a hodge-podge of laws that respect the
conscience of a health care provider in some circumstances
but not others. If the directive to the health care
provider comes from a written living will, the provider can
opt out. If the directive came from someone acting through
a durable power of attorney for health care, the provider
can opt out. However, if the very same directive came from
the patient or a family member, the provider does not have
the right. Unless, of course, the directive is for an
abortion, in which case the provider always has the right
to opt out.
If you find this confusing, you are probably not alone.
Lack of consistency, rather than confusion, is probably the
law’s greatest flaw. A person’s conscience
deserves respect. If the state recognizes the need to
protect the right of a person to engage in health care
procedures that violate his or her conscience, it should do
so in every situation. The ability to opt out should not
depend on the origin of the directive. The source of the
request is irrelevant.
An attempt to address this problem in 1997 led to another
twist. The legislature did not embrace an effort to provide
comprehensive health care conscience protection, but did
separate and pass some protection for health care
facilities. The new statute states that health care
facilities cannot be compelled to provide through a
government contact a procedure that violates the
facility’s religious or moral policies.
Mounting another effort for comprehensive protection might
be difficult. Efforts in other states to pass comprehensive
health care conscience protection are facing up-hill
battles. “Reproductive rights” proponents
oppose any conscience protection for health care providers.
The legislative solution to the problem may rest with
another legislative effort. The conscience rights of health
care providers were not the only persons affected by this
legislative process. The rights and obligations of
patients, persons acting on behalf incapacitated patients,
and other rights and obligations of health care providers
also vary depending upon the circumstances.
An on-going effort to simplify the state’s advance
directives laws and make them more
“user-friendly” may solve all these problems at
one time. The hope is to combine the currently separate
– and inconsistent – statutes on advance
directives and informed consent for incapacitated persons.
A revision of the statutes could provide an opportunity to
eliminate the inconsistencies and provide equal protection
of the rights of everyone involved.